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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTEC-
TION-ALIENS' RIGHTS-GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE-The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that a state may ex-
clude aliens from deputy probation officer positions which involve
the exercise of the sovereign police power.
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982).
In 1975, Jose Chavez-Salido, Ricardo Bohorquez, and Pedro Luis
Ybarra, lawfully admitted resident aliens,' applied for positions as
Deputy Probation Officers with the Los Angeles County Probation
Department." All three were denied employment under California
Government Code section 1031(a),3 which requires that appointees
be United States citizens, although two of the three had clearly
demonstrated themselves to be otherwise qualified for the posi-
tion.4 The three then filed suit against Los Angeles County' in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California,
alleging the unconstitutionality of section 1031(a)'s citizenship re-
quirement under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct 735, 736 (1982). See Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427
F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated sub nom. County of Los Angeles v. Chavez-Salido,
436 U.S. 901 (1978), on remand sub nom. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 490 F. Supp. 984 (C.D.
Cal. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982). Chavez-Salido had been a permanent legal resident
since 1955, Bohorquez since 1961, and Ybarra since 1972. 102 S. Ct. at 744 n.l. Chavez-
Salido ultimately became a citizen in 1976; however, at that time there were no openings for
the position he was previously denied. Id. at 736 n.1.
2. 102 S. Ct. at 736-37.
3. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1031(a) (West Supp. 1981-1982) provides that public officers or
employees who are classified by law as peace officers "shall be citizens of the United States."
See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1981-1982) which lists over seventy job classi-
fications included and excluded from the category of peace officer. CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.5
(West Supp. 1981-1982) provides that any parole or probation officer is a peace officer.
4. One of the appellees held a master's degree, the other two, bachelor's degrees. 102
S. Ct. at 744 n.1. Chavez-Salido and Ybarra both received passing scores on the qualifying
oral examination for Deputy Probation Officer II; Bohorquez did not appeal his failing
score, after being informed that it would be futile to do so since he was not a citizen. Id. at
n.2.
5. Id. at 737. Also named as defendants in the complaint were various county officials
serving in their official capacity. Id. The County contested the jurisdiction of the federal
court; however, the district court held that the plaintiffs stated a claim against the County
on both fourteenth amendment and § 1981 grounds. Id. at n.4.
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1983." The plaintiffs claimed that the statute unlawfully discrimi-
nated against them on the basis of alienage,7 and asked for injunc-
tive relief, monetary damages, and attorneys' fees," as well as a de-
claratory judgment invalidating the statute.'
A three-judge district court,10 employing a strict scrutiny test,"
held that the statutory citizenship requirement of section 1031(a)
was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied.1 2 The district
court based its decision primarily on the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Sugarman v. DougaU1. ' s On appeal, the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded 4 the district court's judgment for
further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Foley v. Connelie.1 5 On remand,1 6 the district court reconsidered
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides in pertinent part that all persons within the juris-
diction of the United States shall have the same right in every state to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings. 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976) provides that liability is imposed on any person who, under color of state law,
deprives another of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.
7. 102 S. Ct. at 737. The appellees also asserted that § 1031(a) infringed upon the
right to travel and upon Congress' exclusive power to regulate aliens. Id. The district court
declined to address these claims. See 427 F. Supp. at 172.
8. 102 S. Ct. at 737. Chavez-Salido and Ybarra sought back pay as damages; Bohor-
quez only requrested the opportunity to take a new examination. Id. at n.3.
9. Id. at 737.
10. The three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)
(repealed 1976), and 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970) (amended 1976). Subsequent to the commence-
ment of this action, Congress has limited the use of three-judge courts. 102 S. Ct. at 737 n.5.
See The Three-Judge Court Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976)).
11. 427 F. Supp. at 169. When a suspect classification affects a substantial right, such
as employment opportunities, a heavy burden of justification is placed on the state to show
that the classification serves a substantial and constitutionally permissible interest, and that
the use of the classification is absolutely necessary to achieve that purpose. Also, the means
employed to achieve the purpose must be precisely drawn. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973) (state court rule requiring citizenship for admission to bar unconstitutionally dis-
criminates against aliens).
12. 102 S. Ct. at 737.
13. 427 F. Supp. at 170. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). In Sugarman,
the Court struck down a New York civil service provision requiring citizenship for appoint-
ment to any position in the state's competitive civil service. While the Court recognized a
state's interest in defining its political community, and in limiting participation in its gov-
ernment to those within the political community, it stated that any statute employing dis-
crimination against aliens must be precisely drawn to achieve an acknowledged state inter-
est in the performance of a basic government function. Id. at 642-43.
14. County of Los Angeles v. Chavez-Salido, 436 U.S. 901 (1978).
15. 425 U.S. 291 (1978). The Court in Foley upheld a New York statute requiring state
troopers to be United States citizens, reasoning that the police power is a basic governmen-
tal function which justified the exclusion of non-citizens. The Court rejected a strict scru-
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its decision, guided by both Foley and Ambach v. Norwick, 7 and
again reached its original conclusion."' The Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction, 19 and reversed, holding that the statutory
citizenship requirement and section 1031(a) were valid,20 and that
the position of probation officer, which involves the exercise of the
state's coercive power, may be limited to citizens.2'
Justice White, speaking for the majority,2 2 first outlined the de-
velopment of constitutional restraints on a state's power to enact
classifications based on alienage, and acknowledged that the
Court's decisions had not always formed a straight line.23 The
Court noted that in its earlier decisions, it had evaluated state
alienage classifications by distinguishing between government dis-
tribution of public resources, which, under the classification sys-
tem, could be limited to citizens, and government intervention in
the private market, from which aliens could not be excluded. 4
tiny analysis as unnecessary where a rational relationship exists between the state interest
sought to be protected and the limiting classification. Id. at 301.
16. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 490 F. Supp. 984 (C.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 735
(1982).
17. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). In Ambach, the Court held that a New York statute denying
public school teacher certification to non-citizens who had not manifested an intention to
apply for citizenship did not violate the equal protection clause. The Court concluded that
public education came within the governmental function doctrine recognized in Sugarman
and Foley, and that therefore only a rational basis test, and not a strict scrutiny standard,
need be applied. Id. at 75.
18. 490 F. Supp. at 990. The district court again applied a strict scrutiny standard and
concluded that no compelling state interest existed to justify limiting the position of proba-
tion officer to citizens. It reasoned that these positions, unlike those of state trooper and
teacher, lacked the characteristics which would bring them within the basic governmental
function exception. Id. Judge Curtis dissented, concluding that probation officers should be
included within the exception, and that a citizenship requirement bore a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 995 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
19. 450 U.S. 978 (1981).
20. 102 S. Ct. at 738.
21. Id. at 743.
22. Id. at 736. Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and
Stewart joined Justice White in the majority opinion.
23. Id. at 738. Justice White noted that this pattern is not an unusual one in legal
development where broad principles, gradually narrowed when applied to new questions,
must be replaced when their underlying distinctions become archaic. Id.
24. Id. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (state statute requiring all employers of
more than five workers to employ no less than eighty percent citizens violated the four-
teenth amendment); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (state statute requiring that only
citizens shall be employed on public works projects did not violate the equal protection
clause); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (state statute limiting the taking of
wild game to citizens was not unconstitutional); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
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This distinction began to erode with the Court's decision in
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,2 ' which held that
whatever ownership interest the State of California purported to
have in off-shore fish was inadequate to justify excluding resident
aliens from making a living by fishing.26 Later, Justice White ex-
plained, Graham v. Richardson27 further eroded the public/private
distinction,2 8 by holding that a state could not withhold welfare
benefits from resident aliens.29 The Graham Court, employing the
two-tiered equal protection analysis,30 had stated that aliens as a
class are a primary example of a "discrete and insular" minority
for whom heightened judicial scrutiny should be invoked."1 Justice
White interpreted Graham as implying that a state may legiti-
mately distinguish between citizens and resident aliens in very few
instances.'2
Since Graham," Justice White noted, the Court has reached its
decisions concerning alienage classifications by making a distinc-
tion between the economic and sovereign functions of government,
beginning with Sugarman v. Dougall." In Sugarman, the Court
recognized a state's interest in limiting participation in its govern-
ment to those within its political community." Although not aban-
doning the view that restrictions that essentially affect the eco-
nomic benefits of aliens are still subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny," the Court concluded that when a restriction serves a po-
(resident aliens fall within the protection of the equal protection clause; a state may not
deny to resident aliens the right to work in private occupations available to citizens).
25. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
26. Id. at 421.
27. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). Graham interpreted Takahashi as casting doubt on the valid-
ity of the public interest doctrine. Id. at 374.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 376.
30. Id. at 371-72.
31. Id. at 372.
32. 102 S. Ct. at 739.'
33. Prior cases, including Graham, dealt almost exclusively with attempts by the
states to withhold certain economic and social benefits from non-citizens. Id.
34. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). See supra note 13.
35. Id. at 642.
36. 102 S. Ct. at 739. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (New York statute
barring certain resident aliens from state educational financial assistance violated equal pro-
tection clause); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (Puerto Rico stat-
ute denying licensing as civil engineer to anyone but citizens violated the fourteenth amend-
ment); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state court rule requiring citizenship for
admission to bar unconstitutionally discriminated against aliens).
Vol. 21:277280
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litical function, particularly in determining membership in the po-
litical community, strict scrutiny is inappropriate. 7 Rather, Justice
White explained, the Court will apply a two-step process to evalu-
ate a state's claim that a restriction serves political rather than ec-
onomic goals,"' as dictated by Sugarman: (1) the classification
must be sufficiently tailored to support the state's claim;39 and (2)
the classification must be applicable only to positions involving
discretionary decision-making or the formulation and execution of
public policy.'0 The Cabell Court found that section 1031(a) met
both of the Sugarman standards.'1
The Court next rejected the district court's conclusion that if
section 1031(a) was overinclusive at all, it could not stand,' indi-
cating that the district court had neglected to employ any standard
at all in drawing its conclusion. 43 The proper standard of review,
according to Justice White, involves an inquiry into whether the
restriction is so broad and indiscriminate that it defeats the state's
claim that it serves only to limit the exercise of an important func-
tion to citizens." Employing this test, the California statute was
held to be facially valid.'6 In examining the positions included
within the category of peace officer, the Court found that the uni-
37. 102 S. Ct. at 739. The Court further indicated that it would not employ strict
scrutiny in matters dealing exclusively with a state's constitutional prerogatives or the oper-
ation of its government. Id. (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)). See supra
note 13.
38. 102 S. Ct. at 740. The Court acknowledged that this distinction has replaced the
public/private distinction. The newer view is prompted by the necessity in a democratic
system of defining the scope of the community involved in the processes of self-government.
The exclusion of aliens from these processes is an unavoidable consequence. Id.
39. The classification in Sugarman did not meet the Supreme Court's standard be-
cause it swept indiscriminately in its restricting of all civil service positions to citizens. 413
U.S. at 643.
40. 102 S. Ct. at 740. See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647. The classification may be ap-
plied only to -those "functions that go to the heart of representative government." Id.
41. 102 S. Ct. at 740. The Court stated that the importance of the government func-
tion, rather than the scope of the policy judgments involved, should be a significant consid-
eration. Id. at n.7.
42. Id. at 740-41. The Court determined that both the district court and the parties
were mistaken in their use of the doctrine of overbreadth, which is employed primarily in
first amendment cases. Id. at n.8.
43. Id.
44. 102 S. Ct. at 741. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979). Under Ambach's
standard, Justice White noted, classifications need not be exact; there must only be a sub-
stantial fit. 102 S. Ct. at 741.
45. 102 S. Ct. at 741.
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fying characteristic of these positions was their law enforcement
power,"' and, as made clear by Foley, the exercise of the state's
police power may properly be limited to citizens. Justice White
held that the statutes at issue were an attempt by California to
limit the exericise of its police power to citizens, and thus were
sufficiently tailored to meet the lower level of scrutiny required by
Sugarman.
4s
Justice White next addressed the citizenship requirement as ap-
plied to the position of deputy probation officer, and again con-
cluded that the district court misapplied Foley and Ambach, stat-
ing that these cases did not define the parameters of permissible
citizenship requirements.49 The Court also pointed out that the re-
sponsibility of defining the fundamental sovereign functions of the
political environment rests in the legislative branches of govern-
ment, and is subject to limited review by the judiciary.50 After ex-
amining the broad functions and responsibilities of probation of-
ficers, which are exercised with a great deal of discretion and
without direct supervision," the Court concluded that a probation
officer acts as an arm of the judicial authority to set the conditions
under which probationers live, and of the executive authority to
ensure obedience to these conditions.2 Applying the governmental
function exception as developed by Foley and Ambach, the Court
held the citizenship requirement of section 1031(a) as applied to
probation officers to be an appropriate limitation on those who
46. Id. All of the persons holding the enumerated positions classified as peace officers
in § 830 have the power to make arrests, and all receive training in the use of firearms. Id. at
742.
47. 102 S. Ct. at 742. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
48. 102 S. Ct. at 742.
49. Id. The Court added that in addition to teachers and state troopers, judges and
jurors could also be required to be citizens, although a judge deals only with a narrow seg-
ment of the community, and a juror acts with little discretion under a specific set of instruc-
tions, unlike teachers and state troopers, who deal with much larger segments of a commu-
nity, and frequently with a great amount of discretion. Id. at 743.
50. Id. at 742.
51. Justice White noted that these functions include the power to arrest and release
probationers over which the probation officer has jurisdiction, and power to ensure that the
conditions of probation are met, and the responsibility to determine whether to release or
detain juvenile offenders, as well as whether to institute judicial proceedings affecting them.
Id. at 743.
52. Id. The Court noted that to the probationer, the probation officer may personify
and symbolize the authority of the state's police power. Id.
282 Vol. 21:277
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both exercise and symbolize the state's sovereign powers."
Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent," stated that the majority
had misapplied the standard of review which has historically been
applied to alienage classifications.55 He advanced his belief that the
majority had ignored both history and its own precedents, while
regressing to a parochial view of public employment."
After reviewing the prospective employees' job qualifications,57
Justice Blackmun traced the development of the Court's decisions
regarding state discrimination against resident aliens,5 8 ending
with the two-step evaluation prescribed by Sugarman," Foley,60
and Ambach,61 and concluded that section 1031(a) could not sur-
vive the rigorous standard mandated by those decisions.62
Justice Blackmun also found that facially, the statute clearly vi-
olated the equal protection clause.6" The listing of over seventy ap-
parently unrelated positions included under the category of peace
officer appeared arbitrary in that no reason had been given by the
legislature for the inclusion of such a variety of positions," nor had
the legislature provided any criteria by which it would decide
which positions should be considered peace officers. Justice
Blackmun considered significant the fact that prior to 1961, Cali-
fornia did not require any of its peace officers to be citizens; then,
without stating a rationale, the legislature passed section 1031, ap-
plying the citizenship requirement to all positions classified as
peace officers, even to those for which the requirement may have
53. Id.
54. Id. at 744 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens




58. See supra note 21.
59. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). See supra note 13.
60. 435 U.S. 291 (1978). See supra note 15.
61. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). See supra note 17.
62. 102 S. Ct. at 746 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 745 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. Id. The list of positions originally included those of toll service employees, live-
stock inspectors, cemetery sextons, fish and game wardens, furniture and bedding inspec-
tors, voluntary fire wardens, and racetrack investigators. However, some of these were elimi-
nated by amendments to the California Penal Code passed in 1980. Id. at n.4. See current
version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1981).
65. 102 S. Ct. at 745 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1982
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been plainly irrelevant. 6
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's failure to review the
history of section 1031(a) before drawing a conclusion that distorts
the holding of Sugarman.6 7 He explained that the Court's interpre-
tation of that case expands the boundaries of the narrow exception
which permits a state to limit to citizens those positions which in-
volve direct participation in the creation and performance of pub-
lic policy,68 while ignoring what the dissent considered an impor-
tant aspect of the Sugarman standard: that even a statute which
legitimately bars aliens from positions within the political commu-
nity nevertheless violates the equal protection clause if it excludes
aliens from other public jobs in an indiscriminate manner. 9 Jus-
tice Blackmun agreed with the district court that section 1031(a) is
just such an exercise of state power because some of the peace of-
ficer positions from which aliens have been barred cannot be
viewed as members of the political community. 0
Justice Blackmun found the statute to be as critically overinclu-
sive and underinclusive as the statute in Sugarman in that, while
it bars noncitizens from obtaining positions for which citizenship
appears irrelevant, it allows noncitizens to obtain other positions
for which citizenship seems to be a more logical requirement.71
Justice Blackmun viewed the majority opinion as a defiance of the
Court's earlier holdings which prohibited the states from excluding
aliens from any occupation for which a citizenship requirement
could not be reasonably imposed. 71 He saw the government func-
tion exception of Sugarman as extremely narrow and limited, al-
lowing a lower level of scrutiny only for those positions involving
participation in the state's political institutions or the operation of
its government.73 To exclude aliens under the exception, the state
66. Justice Blackmun noted that in 1970, the California Attorney General was of the
opinion that there was no compelling state interest to justify limiting certain of the listed
peace officer positions to citizens. Id. at 746 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 747 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 748 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Truax v. Raich, 229 U.S. 33 (1915); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See supra note 24.
73. Id. at 748 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun considered the Court's
opinions prior to and after Sugarman as buttressing this view. Id. See Takahashi v. Fish
and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (California statute denying fishing licenses to cer-
Vol. 21:277
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should be required to make a substantial showing that the position
entails these responsibilities.74
Justice Blackmun then opined that the Court's holdings in Foley
and Ambach require a state to pass the rigorous test of demon-
strating, not only that the position in question involves the exer-
cise of coercive authority and control without intervening supervi-
sion, but also that the requirement of citizenship bears a rational
relationship to the demands of the position.78 He disagreed with
the majority's application of the Sugarman standard in its conclu-
sion that probation officers perform important sovereign functions
of the political community. The same functions that the majority
viewed as so important were seen by Justice Blackmun as not jus-
tifying alien exclusion when examined in a context including other
public positions.7 Justice Blackmun noted that probation officers
are authorized to arrest or detain only in prescribed circum-
stances," and further noted that the state had given this power to
other employees not classified as peace officers, but also not re-
quired to be citizens.78 He also accused the majority of ignoring the
reality that arrest power is given to all private persons in some
circumstances.7 9 While refusing to go so far as to say that proba-
tion officers exercise no discretion, Justice Blackmun pointed out
that their decisions are closely supervised and regulated by stat-
ute."0 Further, he found it significant that aliens may practice law
tain resident aliens violated fourteenth amendment); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(Connecticut statute excluding aliens from admission to state bar association violated four-
teenth amendment; subject to strict judicial scrutiny); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977)
(New York statute barring certain resident aliens from state higher education financial as-
sistance subject to strict scrutiny and violates the equal protection clause).
74. 102 S. Ct. at 748 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 749 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was of the opinion that
without the application of such a rigorous test, the Sugarman exception would absorb the
Sugarman rule. Id.
76. Id.
77. Justice Blackmun pointed out that the number of persons subject to the probation
officer's authority is limited, and that the arrest power over these individuals is restricted to
bringing them before the court, which ultimately decides if they should be held. When the
probationer is a juvenile, he or she may be detained only in emergencies and only for short
periods. Also, the probation officer alone cannot declare a revocation of probation. Id.
78. Id., see CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.7 (West Supp. 1981-1982), describing persons not
peace officers but having powers of arrest.
79. 102 S. Ct. at 749 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 834, § 837
(West Supp. 1981-1982).
80. 102 S. Ct. at 750 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The probation officer's discretion is
exercised primarily in preparing reports, investigating and supervising probationers, and
1982
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as well as be appointed to the positions of superior court judges
and supreme court justices in California,"1 and may even become a
chief juvenile probation officer, if warranted by the interests of the
community. 2 . Justice Blackmun believed that such varied and il-
logical results of the state's statutory scheme belied any claim that
the state was merely attempting to ensure that an important gov-
ernment function remained in the hands of citizens.
83
Finally, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's view of
the significance of the position as an extension of the judicial au-
thority and as a symbol of the state's sovereign power, again ad-
dressing the anomaly that non-citizen attorneys may serve as of-
ficers of the court.84 Justice Blackmun also expressed concern that
if almost any government position can be seen as symbolizing the
state's authority, the limitations on the application of the
Sugarman exception would be destroyed."
In Justice Blackmun's view, the state failed to advance any argu-
ment why non-citizens as a class should be prevented from holding
this position, or why these Spanish-speaking individuals with grad-
uate degrees were not qualified to deal with a possibly Spanish-
speaking, non-citizen probationer population." Further, the state
would be precluded from challenging these aliens' loyalty, as they
were willing to take an oath to support the Constitution; nor could
the state encroach on what is exclusively a federal interest by a
claim that the statute encouraged aliens to apply for citizenship.87
Justice Blackmun concluded that the only reason for the exclusion
of aliens from these positions appeared to be state parochialism
and animosity toward aliens.8 8 On this basis, Justice Blackmun
viewed section 1031(a) as being unconstitutional both facially and
as applied.89
The Supreme Court's decision in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido is only
recommending the terms of probation. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 24001 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
83. 102 S. Ct. at 750 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 751 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973),
supra note 11.







the third in recent history to uphold a state law excluding lawfully
admitted resident aliens from specific occupations.90 The decision
also seems to be another step backwards from the application of a
strict scrutiny standard to classifications in employment based on
alienage, as well as an expansion of the governmental function ex-
ception, a doctrine first advanced in Sugarman v. Dougall.9
Through the time of the Court's holding in Sugarman, it ap-
peared that very few distinctions between citizens and non-citizens
in the area of employment would be held permissible, unless the
employment position at issue could be construed as falling within
the boundaries of the governmental function exception. 92 As origi-
nally stated, the exception appeared to be a narrow one: by virtue
of its responsibility and power to define its political community,
the state could limit certain appropriately defined classes of posi-
tions to citizens. A broad and indiscriminately overinclusive classi-
fication would continue to be subject to strict scrutiny, but when a
class of positions fell within a state prerogative granted by the
Constitution, the Court's scrutiny would demand only a rational
justification for alien exclusion.93 The Court in this way recognized
that non-citizens might be excluded from participation in a state's
political institutions.
The Court, however, provided only vague indications of what
types of positions might be included by such a government func-
tion. The language chosen by the Court to frame the exception was
as significant for what was not, as well as for what was, expressed,9
and it seemed that the exception would include a relatively limited
number of positions. Only later would the Sugarman exception
grow to include state troopers,95 public school teachers," and in
Chavez-Salido, probation officers.
Prior to Sugarman, the Court's decisions concerning alienage-
90. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1979).
91. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
92. Id.
93. 102 S. Ct. at 741.
94. The Court stated that the power to exclude aliens applied to "state elective or
important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who partici-
pate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy. 413 U.S.
at 647-48.
95. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). See also supra note 15.
96. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). See also supra note 17.
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based classifications reflected an increasing tendency to erase dis-
tinctions in employment between citizens and non-citizens, 7 and
firmly established the right of aliens to engage in the "common
occupations of the community." ' These decisions were reached by
the Court's application of a strict scrutiny standard, the use of
which is warranted when a statute employing a suspect classifica-
tion9" is challenged on equal protection grounds. To justify the
classification, the state must show both that it seeks to accomplish
purposes, or protect interests, that are substantial, and that use of
the classification is necessary to the achievement of that goal.'00
The first case to offer an indication of the boundaries of the gov-
ernmental function exception, as well as the standard of review re-
quired, was Foley v. Connelie.10' The Court based its inclusion of
state troopers within the governmental function fold by rejecting
the notion that such a position could be one of the common occu-
pations of the community.102 This required a determination that
the position involved discretionary decision-making, or the execu-
tion of policy affecting members of the political community, specif-
ically citizens. The police power of a state was considered an im-
97. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (New York statute denying higher edu-
cation financial assistance to certain resident aliens violated equal protection clause); see
also Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (Puerto Rico statute denying
licensing as civil engineer to anyone but citizens violated fourteenth amendment); In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state court rule requiring citizenship for admission to bar
violated fourteenth amendment).
98. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). See also supra note 24. Cases uphold-
ing the right to work in the common occupations of the community reveal a repugnance to
exclude the alien from employment for no substantial reason other than the individual's
alienage, and with no determination of the individual's fitness or qualifications. See In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
99. Even before Sugarman, classifications employing alienage as a basis were consid-
ered suspect, and warranted strict judicial scrutiny. Like other discrete classes based on
nationality or race, and historically subject to discrimination, aliens merited increased judi-
cial protection. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). See also supra note 27
and accompanying text.
100. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973).
101. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
102. Id. at 298. The Foley Court considered of primary significance the fact that police
officers are endowed with the authority to arrest citizens, which in conjunction with a broad
spectrum of powers over people generally, requires a high degree of judgment and discre-
tion. Id. at 299. Further, the Court itself stated a rational basis for alien exclusion here by
way of a reminder that many nations do not share our belief in personal freedoms, and that
therefore a requirement that those entrusted with the enforcement of the laws express their
allegiance to the Constitution by being or becoming citizens is not impermissible. Id. at 300.
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portant example of a uniquely governmental function. 10 3
Once it has been demonstrated that a job falls within the gov-
ernment function exception, a different standard of review is ap-
propriate. Under the exception, to justify an alienage classification,
a state need only show a rational relationship between the limiting
classification and the interest it seeks to protect. 04 In Foley, that
interest was the right to govern, which is reserved to citizens. 10 5
This standard constituted recognition by the Court that the discre-
Stionary exercise of policy, here exemplified by the exercise of police
power, can have a profound effect on the lives of a vast number of
citizens. 06
In Ambach v. Norwick,10 7 the Court modified the emphasis of
the inquiry demanded by Foley. In expanding the governmental
function exception to include public school teachers, the Ambach
Court all but ignored the requirement that the position in issue
involve the formulation or review of public policy. 0 8 Instead, the
Court's determination was based on its conclusion that teachers
perform a significant function of government in educating and
shaping the development of the children of the community, 0 9 a
responsibility that "goes to the heart of representative govern-
ment." 10 Teachers do not exercise the same direct power as police
officers, nor can it be said that teachers formulate public policy;
nevertheless, they execute, however indirectly or subtly, the policy
of the state in the performance of one of its more important re-
sponsibilities."' By framing the issue differently, the Ambach
Court stated a broader view of the governmental function excep-
tion, thereby permitting the inclusion of positions which would
have been excluded by the narrower view of Foley.
Central to the decisions applying a rational basis rather than a
strict scrutiny standard, is the Court's view of the meaning and
103. Id.
104. Id. at 296.
105. Id. at 297.
106. Id.
107. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). See supra note 17.
108. Id. at 76.
109. Id. at 75. Of particular importance to the Court was the teacher's obligation to
promote civic virtues, in addition to the opportunity to influence the attitudes of students
toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. Id. at 78.
110. Id. at 79-80.
111. Id. at 80.
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importance of citizenship." 2 The majority in Ambach were of the
opinion that the form of the association with the political commu-
nity is significant; a mere oath of allegiance to the Constitution1
does not constitute a substitute "for the unequivocal bond of citi-
zenship. 11 4 This conception of the importance of citizenship has
the result of allowing a state greater freedom in limiting the em-
ployment of aliens; it reduces to a large degree the effect of the
principle that individual qualifications rather than class held char-
acteristics should determine opportunities for employment.
The effect of the application of a rational basis test in Chavez-
Salido is the exclusion of resident aliens from the position of pro-
bation officer in Los Angeles. The Court has reaffirmed its refusal
to apply a strict scrutiny standard to a restrictive classification
claimed by the state to serve a political purpose. 15 The inclusion
of this position within the exception may be arguable, as evidenced
by the Court's division concerning the question.1
The district court in Chavez-Salido considered section 1031(a)
to be insufficiently tailored, with its inclusion of toll service em-
ployees and cemetery sextons, to support the state's contention
that it served a legitimate political purpose.117 The Supreme Court
upheld the statute, although in Foley it had reaffirmed the rule
that a state may not accomplish its stated purpose with a citizen-
ship requirement that is applied to a wide variety of occupations
without consideration of the differences among the positions.1
112. Id. at 76. The status of citizenship connotes an association with the processes and
institutions of democratic government. The significance of citizenship is reflected in the
Constitution itself, which requires citizenship for the offices of President, U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1, cl. 5; Senator, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; and Representative, id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
113. Compare In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), in which the Court rejected the
contention that only citizens can, in good conscience, take an oath to support the Constitu-
tion. Id. at 726. The Griffiths Court commented favorably on the willingness of the resident
alien who was seeking admission to the Bar, to subscribe to such an oath. Id.
114. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 75.
115. 102 S. Ct. at 739.
116. This confusion is demonstrated by the district court twice holding the California
statute violative of the equal protection clause, even after its examination of the classifica-
tion under Foley and Ambach. See 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated sub nom.
County of Los Angeles v. Chavez-Salido, 436 U.S. 901 (1978), on remand sub nom. Chavez-
Salido v. Cabell, 490 F. Supp. 984 (C.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982).
117. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 490 F. Supp. at 986. This problem, however, was ren-
dered moot by the deletion of these positions by amendments passed in 1980. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 830.4 (West Supp. 1981).
118. See 435 U.S. at 296. See also supra note 15.
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Here, the Court stated that the classification employed will not be
required to be exact, but must only be sufficiently tailored to sup-
port a state's argument that the classification is warranted by its
right to restrict the exercise of governmental power to citizens. 1 9
Under this deferential standard, the Court accepted California's
claim that the statute fulfilled a significant purpose: that of limit-
ing the exercise of the police power, here designated the law en-
forcement function, 12 0 to those within the political community.
The decision that a probation officer is included within the
Sugarman exception and is not one of the common occupations of
the community turns upon the Court's interpretation of the posi-
tion's duties and responsibilities, the scope of which was a central
issue in Chavez-Salido."2 The critical element to the Court was
the law enforcement character of the position. The Court found
significant the probation officer's power to exercise coercive force
over others, including the power to arrest,1 2 a power which may
properly be limited to citizens.'2 3 The Court's conclusion appears
grounded in the character of the position as a personification of
the state's power to punish and rehabilitate criminals, rather than
in the size of its area of influence, or the extent to which the man-
ner of the performance of those powers is within the discretion of
the probation officer. 2 "
In cases such as Chavez-Salido, the Court is presented with a
difficult problem in line-drawing: given the proliferation of public
employment, the question becomes which positions should be held
to be an exercise of a government function, and which should be
119. See 102 S. Ct. at 741.
120. Id.
121. The appellees stressed the highly circumscribed authority and discretion given
the probation officer, and the limited population over whom these are exercised, emphasiz-
ing dissimilarities of teachers and police officers. See Brief for Appellees at 6. The appel-
lants more successfully contended that the responsibilities of probation officers were
uniquely governmental, having no counterpart in the private sector. See Reply Brief for
Appellants at 6.
122. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) in which the Court had occasion to
consider the role played by the probation or parole officer. The Court noted that these posi-
tions are endowed with broad discretion to judge the probationer's progress and rehabilita-
tion, and also with the power to recommend revocation of parole or probation. Id. at 784.
123. 102 S. Ct. at 743.
124. In contrast, both Foley and Ambach emphasized the community-wide responsi-




considered common occupations of the community. The develop-
ment of the law in this area does not facilitate predictable results.
For example, an attorney, while not exercising governmental au-
thority, is nevertheless an officer of the court, and is a position
from which a resident alien may not be barred.125 Yet, while a pro-
bationer's counsel may not be required to be a citizen, his proba-
tion officer may be so required.
2 6
With its decision in Chavez-Salido, the Court has moved toward
the position that only a rational justification should be required to
uphold alienage classifications, and has moved away from the posi-
tion that such classifications will always be suspect. The origin of
this trend can be seen in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Sugarman.127 Justice Rehnquist was of the opinion that alienage as
a basis for discrimination was unlike race or nationality in that the
status of being an alien is one that may be remedied by the indi-
vidual by taking steps toward naturalization.'2 He sought to re-
mind the Court that the Constitution itself admits to differences
between citizens and non-citizens,' 29 and that the first sentence of
the fourteenth amendment distinguishes between persons who by
birth or naturalization are citizens, and persons in general. 30
Before Foley, the Court's decisions may have been interpreted as
implying that both native-born and naturalized citizens are really
no different from aliens, an implication that Justice Rehnquist
found disturbing. 3' As one method of preventing the further blur-
ring of the distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, Justice
Rehnquist favored the application of a rational basis test when
judging these classifications.'
125. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). See also supra note 11.
126. 102 S. Ct. at 750 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
127. 413 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 650 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 651 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also supra note 102.
130. Id. at 652 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist contended that the lan-
guage, as well as the history, of the fourteenth amendment gave no constitutional founda-
tion to the majority's decision in Sugarman. Id. at 653 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. Id. In Sugarman, an efficient government, managed by citizens familiar with the
social and political institutions and mores of American society, was considered to be a ra-
tional justification for the use of the limiting classification. Id. at 661 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). Justice Rehnquist, like the Court later in Foley, believed that unnaturalized aliens
as a class, possibly from societies with values contradictory to those of our culture, could not
be assumed to be sufficiently familiar with the processes of democracy to efficiently exercise
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The danger in the Court's expansion of the Sugarman exception
in Chavez-Salido is that the exception may swallow the rule,13 3 as
Justice Blackmun noted in dissent.13 4 There is also the possibility
that a rational justification may be found for almost any position
that would bring it within the exception. Further, the upholding of
restrictive classifications dilutes the validity of the concept that in-
dividual evaluation of job-related qualifications is constitutionally
preferable to blanket exclusion of an entire class of persons,"56 and
implies that citizenship, whether native or naturalized, should have
its rewards. A third potential problem arises from the Court's ac-
ceptance of the employment of a rational basis test in these cases:
the state is not required to show that the interest sought to be
protected and the means used to protect it are in fact substantially
related, nor that the stated interest is in reality the actual interest
being protected.'
The central issue in all of these cases is, of course, the distinc-
tion between citizens and non-citizens. In allowing a state greater
latitude in defining its political community, Chavez-Salido repre-
sents a further step in the clarification of that distinction. How-
ever, the Court has provided little assistance in predicting where
the expansion of the Sugarman exception may be halted; the in-
clusion of probation officers within the exception neverthless indi-
cates that the Court is prepared to restore, in employment cases,
some benefit to the status of citizenship.
Deborah Candace Phillips
the functions of government. Id. at 662 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. See Schwartz, The Alien Meets Some Constitutional Hurdles in Employment,
Education and Aid Programs, 17 SAN D GO L. REv. 201, 219 (1980). See also Casad, Alien-
age and Public Employment: The Need for an Intermediate Standard in Equal Protection,
32 HASTINGS L.J. 163, 190 (1980).
134. 102 S. Ct. at 749 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
136. The observations made by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Cabell concerning
the inconsistencies inherent in California's statutory scheme led him to voice the concern
that the means employed by California to preserve its interests were too imprecise, and may
be merely a veneer concealing a less worthy motivation. 102 S. Ct. at 749-51 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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